Reorganize source tree: kernel/, v3/, v4/ split and board infrastructure

Source tree reorganization:
- Move StarForth v3 engine to v3/ (src/, include/, Makefile)
- Move kernel to kernel/ (src/, include/, linker/, Makefile)
- Create v4/ skeleton for F18-ISA golden model (DECOMPOSITION.md, JUSTIFICATION.md)
- Move FABRIC-0..4.md to docs/fabric/
- Move ONTOLOGY.md and ROADMAP.md to docs/

Board infrastructure:
- Add boards/ser5/, boards/raspi/, boards/milkv/, boards/zynq7020/
- Each board has board.mk (ISA, CPU flags, boot recipe) and README.md
- Root Makefile becomes thin dispatcher: boot_image, all, clean, docs take TARGET
- make boot_image TARGET=SER5|RASPI|MILKV builds one GPT/MBR image per board
- ZYNQ7020 target exists but stops with clear error (ARMv7 port not built yet)
- scripts/mkdiskimage.sh builds disk images for all boards

Docs pipeline:
- docs/book/ with LaTeX master (main.tex) and Makefile
- pandoc converts Markdown to LaTeX at build time
- Two Lua filters: table-widths.lua (wide tables wrap), code-breaks.lua (inline code breaks)
- make docs builds single PDF (754 pages, 0 missing characters)
- make docs TARGET=<board> adds board appendix
- build/docs/<book|board>/meta.tex stamps git commit into PDF

Bug fixes:
- 42 include paths that only worked by accident now use correct relative paths
- clang-18 hardcode replaced with configurable CC variable (fixed aarch64 build)
- Pi 5: kernel_2712.img linked at 0x80000, .bss zeroed, memory reserved
- Doxyfile, .clang-tidy, README.md, Kconfig paths updated

Verified:
- Hosted v3 build passes 1012 tests, 0 failures
- SER5 image boots in QEMU (OVMF), POST passes, K exact (65536 = Q48_ONE)
- Milk-V image boots in QEMU (OpenSBI + U-Boot + bootefi), POST passes
- make clean TARGET=<board> removes only that board and its ISA objects
- make all builds all boards, hosted v3, and docs in one run

Co-authored-by: Junie <junie@jetbrains.com>
This commit is contained in:
rajames
2026-10-01 15:40:09 -04:00
co-authored by Junie
parent 3c709c115b
commit a8b70e88d3
630 changed files with 2646 additions and 2036 deletions
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/*
StarForth — Steady-State Virtual Machine Runtime
Copyright (c) 2023–2025 Robert A. James
All rights reserved.
This file is part of the StarForth project.
Licensed under the StarForth License, Version 1.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at:
https://github.com/star.4th@proton.me/StarForth/LICENSE.txt
This software is provided "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
express or implied, including but not limited to the warranties of
merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and noninfringement.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
/**
* vm_identity.h - Per-VM owner identity + ACL capabilities (FABRIC-2.md
* §F.2/§F.16, decided 2026-08-27/28)
*
* Holds only what a VM needs to prove *who owns it* and *what that owner
* is allowed to do* -- never a private key. A regular VM's lock never
* signs anything itself, so no seed/private material belongs here at all
* (unlike Zuse's own zuse_cert_seed/zuse_cert_pubkey pair, which does need
* one because she actively signs). Deliberately its own header rather
* than inline fields on struct VM, mirroring VMUuid's own precedent
* (vm_uuid.h) -- standing instruction: give real-shaped data its own
* header and integrate as a field, don't grow struct VM ad hoc.
*
* acl_caps is a capability bitmask, not an ordered privilege tier
* (decided 2026-08-28) -- independent bits, not a nested hierarchy. Zuse
* is not a structurally special VM: her identity just has every bit set.
* No bit values are assigned yet -- deliberate slack, per this project's
* "flexibility until we understand the recipe" precedent (see
* blk_meta_t's own acl_reserved bytes, FABRIC-2.md §F.4) -- real bits get
* names only once the operation they gate actually gets built (BINDSTEP,
* MINT, ...), not speculatively here.
*/
#ifndef STARKERNEL_VM_IDENTITY_H
#define STARKERNEL_VM_IDENTITY_H
#ifdef __STARKERNEL__
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stddef.h>
typedef struct {
uint8_t owner_pubkey[32]; /**< Ed25519 public key of this VM's owning
* identity. Meaningless unless installed
* is set. */
uint8_t installed; /**< 0 = no identity installed yet (e.g.
* Hera/Hermes/Artemis today, before
* D.5's per-VM-identity work lands) --
* BINDSTEP-style checks must treat this
* as "no lock, allow freely," matching
* §F.9 decision 2. 1 = owner_pubkey/
* acl_caps are real. */
uint32_t acl_caps; /**< Capability bitmask. All-zero until a
* real caller defines and checks a bit;
* VM_IDENTITY_CAP_ALL for Zuse's own
* identity ("her ACL just grants
* everything," not a special VM type). */
} VMIdentity;
/** Every capability bit set -- Zuse's own identity uses this, not a
* distinct "is this Zuse" flag anywhere else in the system. */
#define VM_IDENTITY_CAP_ALL 0xFFFFFFFFu
/**
* vm_identity_has_cap - Check whether an installed identity holds a
* capability. Returns 0 (denied) if identity isn't installed at all --
* callers that mean "no lock, allow freely" (§F.9 decision 2) must check
* installed themselves first, not call this and treat 0 as a denial in
* that case.
*
* @param id Identity to check.
* @param cap A single capability bit (or bits) to test for.
* @return Non-zero if id is installed and every bit in cap is set.
*/
int vm_identity_has_cap(const VMIdentity *id, uint32_t cap);
/**
* vm_identity_from_cert - CERTVERIFY (FABRIC-2.md §F.7/§F.17): verify a
* DER-encoded, Zuse-signed X.509 cert and populate a VMIdentity from it.
*
* Three checks, all must pass: the cert's own signature verifies against
* issuer_pubkey (Zuse's own on-device key -- a separate trust root from
* the capsule-PKI chain, no chain walk needed); the cert's serialNumber
* equals drive_uuid byte-for-byte (binds this cert to one physical drive,
* §F.7 decision 2 -- a copied cert on different media will not verify);
* the subject's Ed25519 public key extracts cleanly.
*
* acl_caps is *not* read from the cert -- nothing in the decided cert
* fields encodes capabilities (§F.16). It's supplied by the caller, whose
* job it is to decide what this verified identity is allowed to do (e.g.
* comparing the extracted pubkey against Zuse's own system-resident
* pubkey to decide VM_IDENTITY_CAP_ALL vs. a lesser default) -- that
* policy decision doesn't belong inside a pure verification function.
*
* @param out Populated on success; left untouched on failure.
* @param der DER-encoded certificate bytes.
* @param der_len Their length.
* @param issuer_pubkey Zuse's own Ed25519 public key.
* @param drive_uuid This physical drive's own 16-byte drive_uuid
* (homeblocks_sig_t), compared against the cert's
* serialNumber.
* @param acl_caps Capability bitmask to install, caller-decided.
* @return 0 on success, -1 if any check fails (malformed DER, wrong
* signature algorithm, signature doesn't verify, serial mismatch,
* or the extracted key isn't a valid Ed25519 point).
*/
int vm_identity_from_cert(VMIdentity *out, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len,
const uint8_t issuer_pubkey[32],
const uint8_t drive_uuid[16], uint32_t acl_caps);
#endif /* __STARKERNEL__ */
#endif /* STARKERNEL_VM_IDENTITY_H */