Reorganize source tree: kernel/, v3/, v4/ split and board infrastructure

Source tree reorganization:
- Move StarForth v3 engine to v3/ (src/, include/, Makefile)
- Move kernel to kernel/ (src/, include/, linker/, Makefile)
- Create v4/ skeleton for F18-ISA golden model (DECOMPOSITION.md, JUSTIFICATION.md)
- Move FABRIC-0..4.md to docs/fabric/
- Move ONTOLOGY.md and ROADMAP.md to docs/

Board infrastructure:
- Add boards/ser5/, boards/raspi/, boards/milkv/, boards/zynq7020/
- Each board has board.mk (ISA, CPU flags, boot recipe) and README.md
- Root Makefile becomes thin dispatcher: boot_image, all, clean, docs take TARGET
- make boot_image TARGET=SER5|RASPI|MILKV builds one GPT/MBR image per board
- ZYNQ7020 target exists but stops with clear error (ARMv7 port not built yet)
- scripts/mkdiskimage.sh builds disk images for all boards

Docs pipeline:
- docs/book/ with LaTeX master (main.tex) and Makefile
- pandoc converts Markdown to LaTeX at build time
- Two Lua filters: table-widths.lua (wide tables wrap), code-breaks.lua (inline code breaks)
- make docs builds single PDF (754 pages, 0 missing characters)
- make docs TARGET=<board> adds board appendix
- build/docs/<book|board>/meta.tex stamps git commit into PDF

Bug fixes:
- 42 include paths that only worked by accident now use correct relative paths
- clang-18 hardcode replaced with configurable CC variable (fixed aarch64 build)
- Pi 5: kernel_2712.img linked at 0x80000, .bss zeroed, memory reserved
- Doxyfile, .clang-tidy, README.md, Kconfig paths updated

Verified:
- Hosted v3 build passes 1012 tests, 0 failures
- SER5 image boots in QEMU (OVMF), POST passes, K exact (65536 = Q48_ONE)
- Milk-V image boots in QEMU (OpenSBI + U-Boot + bootefi), POST passes
- make clean TARGET=<board> removes only that board and its ISA objects
- make all builds all boards, hosted v3, and docs in one run

Co-authored-by: Junie <junie@jetbrains.com>
This commit is contained in:
rajames
2026-10-01 15:40:09 -04:00
co-authored by Junie
parent 3c709c115b
commit a8b70e88d3
630 changed files with 2646 additions and 2036 deletions
+818
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,818 @@
/*
StarForth — Steady-State Virtual Machine Runtime
Copyright (c) 2023–2025 Robert A. James
All rights reserved.
This file is part of the StarForth project.
Licensed under the StarForth License, Version 1.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at:
https://github.com/star.4th@proton.me/StarForth/LICENSE.txt
This software is provided "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
express or implied, including but not limited to the warranties of
merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and noninfringement.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
/**
* kernel_hermes.c - Kernel-resident Hermes: the heat-coupled allocator,
* its release path, and the four-counter ledger (FABRIC-3.6.md tasks
* 2.2/2.3/2.4, item 28).
*
* CORRECTION (task 2.3, found while starting it): task 2.2's first cut of
* sk_hermes_alloc() pulled reservoir heat but never admitted a real
* Stadium-floor patron -- it just set a local `in_use` flag. That is
* wrong: FABRIC-3.5.md SXXXIII.4 item 1 states plainly that
* "MSG-FREE-NODE returns it via STADIUM-EVICT", which only has something
* to evict if allocation admitted something. More importantly, SXL.4's
* invariant is Sigma(resident patron heat) + reservoir + consumed ==
* Q48_ONE -- if held message heat is not a resident patron, it is
* invisible to every term of that equation while held, which cannot be
* right. Corrected here: sk_hermes_alloc() now calls stadium_admit()
* with the pulled heat, storing the returned cell index in the message's
* own stadium_cell field for release to evict later. Behaviour
* DELIVER (1), matching messaging.4th's own `SB-DELIVER STADIUM-ADMIT`
* at its MSG-ALLOC site.
*/
#ifdef __STARKERNEL__
#include <string.h>
#include "freestanding/stdio.h" /* task 3.9 evidence print -- snprintf() */
#include "starkernel/vm/kernel_hermes.h"
#include "starkernel/vm/stadium.h"
#include "starkernel/q48_16.h"
#include "starkernel/kmalloc.h"
#include "console.h"
#include "vm.h" /* task 3.4 -- VM struct fields, vm_interpret() */
/* Freestanding: no libc printf. Prints an unsigned decimal, no leading
* zeros -- same small helper stadium.c/capsule_vm_switch_signal.c each
* carry their own copy of. */
static void console_put_u64(uint64_t v) {
char buf[21];
int i = 20;
buf[20] = '\0';
if (v == 0) {
console_puts("0");
return;
}
while (v > 0 && i > 0) {
buf[--i] = (char)('0' + (v % 10));
v /= 10;
}
console_puts(&buf[i]);
}
static SkHermesMessage sk_hermes_msgs[SK_HERMES_MSG_MAX];
/* Task 2.4 (item 28), FABRIC-3.5.md SXXXVII.3/SXL.4's four counters.
* `consumed` is declared now but touched nowhere yet -- task 2.5 adds
* its one increment site when decay exists to record a delta from. */
static uint64_t sk_hermes_held = 0;
static uint64_t sk_hermes_pulled = 0;
static uint64_t sk_hermes_returned = 0;
static uint64_t sk_hermes_consumed = 0;
void sk_hermes_ledger(uint64_t *held, uint64_t *pulled, uint64_t *returned, uint64_t *consumed) {
if (held) *held = sk_hermes_held;
if (pulled) *pulled = sk_hermes_pulled;
if (returned) *returned = sk_hermes_returned;
if (consumed) *consumed = sk_hermes_consumed;
}
int sk_hermes_audit_values(uint64_t held, uint64_t pulled, uint64_t returned, uint64_t consumed) {
/* Epsilon zero (SXXXVII.3): exact integer equality, no tolerance. */
return held == pulled - returned - consumed;
}
static uint64_t sk_hermes_audit_failures = 0;
int sk_hermes_audit(void) {
int ok = sk_hermes_audit_values(sk_hermes_held, sk_hermes_pulled,
sk_hermes_returned, sk_hermes_consumed);
if (!ok) {
sk_hermes_audit_failures++;
console_println("Kernel-Hermes AUDIT FAILURE: held != pulled - returned - consumed");
}
return ok;
}
uint64_t sk_hermes_audit_failure_count(void) {
return sk_hermes_audit_failures;
}
uint64_t sk_hermes_scan_held(size_t *live_count) {
uint64_t sum = 0;
size_t n = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SK_HERMES_MSG_MAX; i++) {
if (!sk_hermes_msgs[i].in_use || sk_hermes_msgs[i].stadium_cell < 0) continue;
sum += stadium_cells()[sk_hermes_msgs[i].stadium_cell].header.heat;
n++;
}
if (live_count) *live_count = n;
return sum;
}
int sk_hermes_scan_check(void) {
return sk_hermes_scan_held((size_t *)0) == sk_hermes_held;
}
static int sk_hermes_find_free_slot(void) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SK_HERMES_MSG_MAX; i++) {
if (!sk_hermes_msgs[i].in_use) return i;
}
return -1;
}
int sk_hermes_alloc(VMUuid vm_id, SkHermesMessage **out_msg) {
int slot;
uint64_t pulled;
StadiumPatronHeader candidate;
size_t cell;
if (!out_msg) return -1;
/* Check affordability before touching the reservoir at all -- this is
* what "roll back on refusal" reduces to when the check happens
* first: there is nothing to roll back. */
if (stadium_reservoir_peek(vm_id) < SK_HERMES_Q_SLOT) return -1;
slot = sk_hermes_find_free_slot();
if (slot < 0) return -1; /* arena full, reservoir untouched */
pulled = stadium_reservoir_pull(vm_id, SK_HERMES_Q_SLOT);
if (pulled < SK_HERMES_Q_SLOT) {
/* Should not happen given the peek check above (nothing else runs
* between the two calls on this single-core, cooperative kernel),
* but roll back explicitly rather than trust that invariant
* silently. */
if (pulled > 0) stadium_reservoir_push(vm_id, pulled);
return -1;
}
memset(&candidate, 0, sizeof(candidate));
/* Matches messaging.4th's own MSG-ALLOC: the slot's own index becomes
* the admitted patron's identity, which stadium_dispatch()'s DELIVER
* case later prints back as "msg_idx=" on release -- an arbitrary
* distinct value would satisfy the conservation math just as well,
* but this keeps the diagnostic meaningful instead of every message
* printing identity 0. */
candidate.identity = (uint64_t)slot;
candidate.heat = pulled; /* the reservoir pull itself, unmodified */
candidate.ttl = 0; /* decay/TTL is task 2.5's scope, not this one's */
candidate.link = 0;
candidate.contains = STADIUM_CONTAINS_NONE;
candidate.mass = 1; /* message body lives in sk_hermes_msgs[], not here */
candidate.flags = 0;
candidate.behaviour = (uint8_t)STADIUM_BEHAVIOUR_DELIVER;
cell = stadium_admit(vm_id, &candidate);
if (cell == STADIUM_CELL_NONE) {
/* Stadium floor itself refused (unrelated to heat affordability,
* already confirmed above) -- roll back the pull, same "leave
* everything exactly as found" discipline as every other refusal
* path here. */
stadium_reservoir_push(vm_id, pulled);
return -1;
}
memset(&sk_hermes_msgs[slot], 0, sizeof(SkHermesMessage));
sk_hermes_msgs[slot].in_use = 1;
sk_hermes_msgs[slot].stadium_cell = (int32_t)cell;
sk_hermes_msgs[slot].owner = vm_id;
*out_msg = &sk_hermes_msgs[slot];
/* Task 2.4: the one site where held/pulled increment -- only reached
* once every refusal path above has already returned. */
sk_hermes_held += pulled;
sk_hermes_pulled += pulled;
sk_hermes_audit();
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_release(SkHermesMessage *msg) {
int rc;
uint64_t remaining;
if (!msg || !msg->in_use) return -1;
if (msg->stadium_cell < 0) {
memset(msg, 0, sizeof(*msg));
return -1;
}
/* Read the patron's current heat BEFORE eviction -- stadium_evict()
* zeroes the header as part of returning the cell to the free list,
* and its own return value is a success code, not the amount
* credited. Today (before task 2.5's decay exists) this always
* equals exactly what was pulled at allocation; once decay exists,
* this is the message's true remaining heat, which is what actually
* flows back to the reservoir -- reading it here rather than
* assuming the original pulled amount is what keeps this correct
* without changes once task 2.5 lands. */
remaining = stadium_cells()[msg->stadium_cell].header.heat;
/* stadium_evict() returns the departing patron's remaining heat to
* its owner's reservoir itself (stadium.c: "the departing patron's
* remaining heat must flow back to its owner's reservoir before the
* cell returns to the free list") -- release does not touch the
* reservoir directly, the eviction path does it, matching
* MSG-FREE-NODE's own shape ("DUP 5 CELLS + @ STADIUM-EVICT DROP"). */
rc = stadium_evict((size_t)msg->stadium_cell);
/* Task 2.4: the one site where held/returned change on release. Only
* on successful eviction -- a refused eviction leaves the patron
* (and its heat) exactly where it was, so the ledger must not move
* either. */
if (rc == 0) {
sk_hermes_held -= remaining;
sk_hermes_returned += remaining;
sk_hermes_audit();
}
memset(msg, 0, sizeof(*msg));
return rc;
}
int sk_hermes_decay(SkHermesMessage *msg) {
uint64_t before, after;
StadiumCell *cell;
if (!msg || !msg->in_use || msg->stadium_cell < 0) return -1;
cell = &stadium_cells()[msg->stadium_cell];
before = cell->header.heat;
after = (uint64_t)q48_mul((q48_16_t)before, (q48_16_t)SK_HERMES_Q_DECAY);
cell->header.heat = after;
/* Task 2.5: the one site where consumed increments (and where held
* pays for it). SXXXVII.3: decay's delta is exact and in hand here. */
sk_hermes_consumed += before - after;
sk_hermes_held -= before - after;
stadium_consumed_record(msg->owner, before - after);
sk_hermes_audit();
return 0;
}
/* Task 3.2 (item 27, B1 / FABRIC-3.5.md SXLV.1): the channel table. See
* kernel_hermes.h's own doc comment on this section for scope and sizing
* reasoning. */
static SkHermesChannel *sk_hermes_channels = (SkHermesChannel *)0;
static int sk_hermes_channel_capacity_val = 0;
int sk_hermes_channels_boot_init(void) {
size_t max_vm_count = stadium_max_vm_count();
SkHermesChannel *table;
size_t i;
if (max_vm_count == 0) return -1; /* Stadium not yet initialized */
table = (SkHermesChannel *)kmalloc(max_vm_count * sizeof(SkHermesChannel));
if (!table) return -1;
for (i = 0; i < max_vm_count; i++) {
memset(&table[i], 0, sizeof(SkHermesChannel));
}
/* The common channel exists from boot (SXLV.1), empty -- VMs join it
* at birth (kernel_main.c/capsule_birth.c task 3.2 wiring), not here. */
table[SK_HERMES_CHANNEL_COMMON].in_use = 1;
sk_hermes_channels = table;
sk_hermes_channel_capacity_val = (int)max_vm_count;
console_puts("Kernel-Hermes: ");
console_put_u64((uint64_t)max_vm_count);
console_println(" channel slots");
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_capacity(void) {
return sk_hermes_channel_capacity_val;
}
static int channel_valid(int channel_id) {
return sk_hermes_channels &&
channel_id >= 0 &&
channel_id < sk_hermes_channel_capacity_val &&
sk_hermes_channels[channel_id].in_use;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_create(void) {
int i;
if (!sk_hermes_channels) return -1;
/* Index 0 is always in_use (the common channel), so this scan never
* returns it -- start at 1 purely as a scan-cost micro-optimisation,
* not for correctness (the in_use check alone would already skip it). */
for (i = 1; i < sk_hermes_channel_capacity_val; i++) {
if (!sk_hermes_channels[i].in_use) {
memset(&sk_hermes_channels[i], 0, sizeof(SkHermesChannel));
sk_hermes_channels[i].in_use = 1;
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_destroy(int channel_id) {
if (channel_id == SK_HERMES_CHANNEL_COMMON) return -1; /* permanent, SXLV.1 */
if (!channel_valid(channel_id)) return -1;
memset(&sk_hermes_channels[channel_id], 0, sizeof(SkHermesChannel));
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_subscribe(int channel_id, VMUuid vm_id) {
SkHermesMembership *m;
size_t i;
if (!channel_valid(channel_id)) return -1;
m = &sk_hermes_channels[channel_id].membership;
for (i = 0; i < m->count; i++) {
if (vm_uuid_equal(m->members[i], vm_id)) return -1; /* already a member */
}
if (m->count >= SK_HERMES_MEMBER_MAX) return -1;
m->members[m->count] = vm_id;
m->count++;
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_unsubscribe(int channel_id, VMUuid vm_id) {
SkHermesMembership *m;
size_t i;
if (!channel_valid(channel_id)) return -1;
m = &sk_hermes_channels[channel_id].membership;
for (i = 0; i < m->count; i++) {
if (vm_uuid_equal(m->members[i], vm_id)) {
size_t j;
for (j = i; j < m->count - 1; j++) {
m->members[j] = m->members[j + 1];
}
m->count--;
return 0;
}
}
return -1; /* not a member */
}
int sk_hermes_channel_is_member(int channel_id, VMUuid vm_id) {
SkHermesMembership *m;
size_t i;
if (!channel_valid(channel_id)) return 0;
m = &sk_hermes_channels[channel_id].membership;
for (i = 0; i < m->count; i++) {
if (vm_uuid_equal(m->members[i], vm_id)) return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_member_count(int channel_id) {
if (!channel_valid(channel_id)) return -1;
return (int)sk_hermes_channels[channel_id].membership.count;
}
/* Task 3.3: per-subscriber pending queue table. See kernel_hermes.h's own
* doc comments on sk_hermes_queues_boot_init()/SK_HERMES_PENDING_MAX for
* scope and sizing reasoning. A queue is found-or-created lazily by
* vm_id, same shape as stadium.c's quota_slot_for_vm() and session.c's
* session_find() -- not pre-populated at birth like channel membership
* is, since not every VM ever receives a message. */
typedef struct {
VMUuid vm_id;
int in_use;
int slots[SK_HERMES_PENDING_MAX]; /* sk_hermes_msgs[] indices, circular FIFO */
size_t head;
size_t count;
} SkHermesPendingQueue;
static SkHermesPendingQueue *sk_hermes_queues = (SkHermesPendingQueue *)0;
static int sk_hermes_queue_capacity_val = 0;
int sk_hermes_queues_boot_init(void) {
size_t max_vm_count = stadium_max_vm_count();
SkHermesPendingQueue *table;
size_t i;
if (max_vm_count == 0) return -1; /* Stadium not yet initialized */
table = (SkHermesPendingQueue *)kmalloc(max_vm_count * sizeof(SkHermesPendingQueue));
if (!table) return -1;
for (i = 0; i < max_vm_count; i++) {
memset(&table[i], 0, sizeof(SkHermesPendingQueue));
}
sk_hermes_queues = table;
sk_hermes_queue_capacity_val = (int)max_vm_count;
console_puts("Kernel-Hermes: ");
console_put_u64((uint64_t)max_vm_count);
console_println(" pending-queue slots");
return 0;
}
static SkHermesPendingQueue *find_queue(VMUuid vm_id) {
int i;
if (!sk_hermes_queues) return (SkHermesPendingQueue *)0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_hermes_queue_capacity_val; i++) {
if (sk_hermes_queues[i].in_use && vm_uuid_equal(sk_hermes_queues[i].vm_id, vm_id)) {
return &sk_hermes_queues[i];
}
}
return (SkHermesPendingQueue *)0;
}
static SkHermesPendingQueue *find_or_create_queue(VMUuid vm_id) {
int i, free_slot = -1;
if (!sk_hermes_queues) return (SkHermesPendingQueue *)0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_hermes_queue_capacity_val; i++) {
if (sk_hermes_queues[i].in_use && vm_uuid_equal(sk_hermes_queues[i].vm_id, vm_id)) {
return &sk_hermes_queues[i];
}
if (!sk_hermes_queues[i].in_use && free_slot < 0) free_slot = i;
}
if (free_slot < 0) return (SkHermesPendingQueue *)0; /* table full */
memset(&sk_hermes_queues[free_slot], 0, sizeof(SkHermesPendingQueue));
sk_hermes_queues[free_slot].vm_id = vm_id;
sk_hermes_queues[free_slot].in_use = 1;
return &sk_hermes_queues[free_slot];
}
/* Task 3.4: system-wide sum of every queue's count, maintained alongside
* queue_push()/sk_hermes_pending_pop() below -- lets
* sk_hermes_drain_checkpoint() skip its per-VM queue lookup entirely
* (stadium_max_vm_count()-sized linear scan) on every word dispatch when
* nothing is pending anywhere, the overwhelmingly common case. */
static int sk_hermes_pending_total = 0;
static int queue_push(SkHermesPendingQueue *q, int msg_index) {
size_t tail;
if (q->count >= SK_HERMES_PENDING_MAX) return -1;
tail = (q->head + q->count) % SK_HERMES_PENDING_MAX;
q->slots[tail] = msg_index;
q->count++;
sk_hermes_pending_total++;
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_send_one(VMUuid from, VMUuid to, uint32_t type, uint32_t channel_id,
void *payload_addr, uint32_t payload_len) {
SkHermesMessage *msg;
SkHermesPendingQueue *q;
int idx;
/* Task 3.5: the one-block bound, enforced uniformly here whether or
* not payload_addr happens to be a chunk carrier -- see
* kernel_hermes.h's own sizing note on why SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_SLICE
* (not SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_PAYLOAD) is a chunk's own content size. */
if (payload_len > SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_PAYLOAD) return -1;
if (sk_hermes_alloc(from, &msg) != 0) return -1;
/* Real defect, found 2026-09-22 (FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.8's own
* findings log): this used to store the caller's own payload_addr
* as-is, a pointer this function does not own. Two sends before
* either drains meant both messages pointed at the same
* caller-owned buffer -- whichever send wrote last silently won.
* Copy into this message's own payload_buf instead (kernel_hermes.h,
* sized to SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_PAYLOAD, the bound already enforced
* above) and point payload_addr at that -- every message now owns
* its payload bytes, independent of whatever the caller does with
* its own buffer afterward. payload_len == 0 is a real, valid case
* (an empty payload) -- memcpy of 0 bytes is well-defined even with
* a NULL payload_addr -- guarded anyway (C's memcpy() is technically
* undefined for a NULL argument even at length 0), matching this
* project's own STRICT_PTR discipline elsewhere. */
if (payload_len > 0) memcpy(msg->payload_buf, payload_addr, payload_len);
msg->payload_addr = msg->payload_buf;
msg->type = type;
msg->from = from;
msg->to = to;
msg->payload_len = payload_len;
msg->channel = channel_id;
q = find_or_create_queue(to);
if (!q) {
sk_hermes_release(msg); /* roll back -- no destination queue */
return -1;
}
idx = (int)(msg - sk_hermes_msgs);
if (queue_push(q, idx) != 0) {
sk_hermes_release(msg); /* roll back -- destination queue full */
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_publish(VMUuid from, int channel_id, uint32_t type,
void *payload_addr, uint32_t payload_len) {
SkHermesMembership *m;
size_t i;
int delivered = 0;
if (!channel_valid(channel_id)) return -1;
if (payload_len > SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_PAYLOAD) return -1; /* see sk_hermes_send_one()'s
* own check -- duplicated here
* so publish() itself returns
* -1 (not a silent 0) on an
* oversized payload */
m = &sk_hermes_channels[channel_id].membership;
for (i = 0; i < m->count; i++) {
if (sk_hermes_send_one(from, m->members[i], type, (uint32_t)channel_id,
payload_addr, payload_len) == 0) {
delivered++;
}
}
return delivered;
}
int sk_hermes_pending_count(VMUuid vm_id) {
SkHermesPendingQueue *q = find_queue(vm_id);
return q ? (int)q->count : 0;
}
SkHermesMessage *sk_hermes_pending_peek(VMUuid vm_id) {
SkHermesPendingQueue *q = find_queue(vm_id);
if (!q || q->count == 0) return (SkHermesMessage *)0;
return &sk_hermes_msgs[q->slots[q->head]];
}
int sk_hermes_pending_pop(VMUuid vm_id) {
SkHermesPendingQueue *q = find_queue(vm_id);
if (!q || q->count == 0) return -1;
q->head = (q->head + 1) % SK_HERMES_PENDING_MAX;
q->count--;
sk_hermes_pending_total--;
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_drain_checkpoint(VM *vm) {
SkHermesMessage *msg;
VMUuid self;
char saved_input[INPUT_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t saved_length, saved_pos;
vm_mode_t saved_mode;
int saved_error, saved_abort;
int drain_error;
if (!vm) return -1;
if (sk_hermes_pending_total == 0) return 0; /* fast path -- see this
* counter's own doc comment */
self = vm->stadium_vm_id;
msg = sk_hermes_pending_peek(self);
if (!msg) return 0;
/* See kernel_hermes.h's own doc comment on this function for why all
* six of these must be preserved, not just the obvious ones. */
memcpy(saved_input, vm->input_buffer, sizeof(saved_input));
saved_length = vm->input_length;
saved_pos = vm->input_pos;
saved_mode = vm->mode;
saved_error = vm->error;
saved_abort = vm->abort_requested;
/* FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.9 evidence: CONSOLE-CMD-EVENT has no fixed
* FORTH handler word to hang a print on (task 3.8's BLK-ATTACH-ACK
* did) -- its payload is an arbitrary console line, interpreted
* as-is below. So the evidence line lives here instead, gated on
* msg->type, printed before vm_interpret() runs while this
* message's heat is still held (release()/pop() are further down
* in this same function) -- the same mid-hold-instant evidence task
* 3.8 used, same honest limit: evidence for mid-hold, not
* post-release. console_println, not log_message() (confirmed
* invisible in this build's serial capture, task 3.8's own
* finding); fires once per relayed console line, not per word. */
if (msg->type == SK_HERMES_MSG_TYPE_CONSOLE_CMD) {
uint64_t held, pulled, returned, consumed;
char line[160];
int conserved = stadium_conserved(self);
sk_hermes_ledger(&held, &pulled, &returned, &consumed);
snprintf(line, sizeof(line),
"Kernel-Hermes CONSOLE-CMD-EVENT (real, Stage D): ledger held=%llu "
"pulled=%llu returned=%llu consumed=%llu stadium_conserved(self)=%s",
(unsigned long long)held, (unsigned long long)pulled,
(unsigned long long)returned, (unsigned long long)consumed,
conserved ? "true" : "FALSE");
console_println(line);
}
/* FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.10 evidence: ELEVATE-REQUEST also has no fixed
* C-side handler word -- its payload is a FORTH command string
* calling ELEVATE-GRANT (zuse-eligibility.4th), interpreted as-is
* below, same shape as CONSOLE-CMD-EVENT above. Same mid-hold-instant
* evidence, same reasoning; `self` here is always Hera (`vm`'s own
* caller already resolved it that way in KH-ELEVATE-SEND, since
* ELEVATE-GRANT only ever runs on Hera). */
if (msg->type == SK_HERMES_MSG_TYPE_ELEVATE_REQUEST) {
uint64_t held, pulled, returned, consumed;
char line[160];
int conserved = stadium_conserved(self);
sk_hermes_ledger(&held, &pulled, &returned, &consumed);
snprintf(line, sizeof(line),
"Kernel-Hermes ELEVATE-REQUEST (real, Stage D): ledger held=%llu "
"pulled=%llu returned=%llu consumed=%llu stadium_conserved(self)=%s",
(unsigned long long)held, (unsigned long long)pulled,
(unsigned long long)returned, (unsigned long long)consumed,
conserved ? "true" : "FALSE");
console_println(line);
}
vm->mode = MODE_INTERPRET; /* a payload is never compiled into whatever
* the enclosing context was mid-defining */
vm_interpret(vm, (const char *)msg->payload_addr);
drain_error = vm->error;
memcpy(vm->input_buffer, saved_input, sizeof(saved_input));
vm->input_length = saved_length;
vm->input_pos = saved_pos;
vm->mode = saved_mode;
vm->error = saved_error; /* a bad message must not abort the
* enclosing execution */
vm->abort_requested = saved_abort;
sk_hermes_release(msg);
sk_hermes_pending_pop(self);
return drain_error ? -1 : 1;
}
uint32_t sk_hermes_chunk_count(uint32_t len) {
if (len == 0) return 0;
return (len + SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_SLICE - 1) / SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_SLICE;
}
int sk_hermes_reassemble(SkHermesMessage **chunks, int n_chunks,
uint8_t *out_buf, uint32_t out_buf_cap,
uint32_t *out_len) {
int present[SK_HERMES_MSG_MAX];
int i;
uint32_t msg_id;
uint32_t total;
uint32_t last_slice_len = 0;
if (!chunks || n_chunks <= 0 || !out_buf || !out_len) return -1;
if (n_chunks > SK_HERMES_MSG_MAX) return -1; /* guard before indexing present[] */
for (i = 0; i < n_chunks; i++) present[i] = 0;
if (!chunks[0] || !chunks[0]->payload_addr ||
chunks[0]->payload_len < (uint32_t)sizeof(SkHermesChunkHeader)) return -1;
msg_id = ((SkHermesChunkHeader *)chunks[0]->payload_addr)->msg_id;
for (i = 0; i < n_chunks; i++) {
SkHermesMessage *m = chunks[i];
SkHermesChunkHeader *h;
uint32_t slice_len;
if (!m || !m->payload_addr || m->payload_len < (uint32_t)sizeof(SkHermesChunkHeader)) return -1;
h = (SkHermesChunkHeader *)m->payload_addr;
slice_len = m->payload_len - (uint32_t)sizeof(SkHermesChunkHeader);
if (h->msg_id != msg_id) return -1;
if (h->seq >= (uint32_t)n_chunks) return -1;
if (present[h->seq]) return -1; /* duplicate seq */
present[h->seq] = 1;
if (h->seq == (uint32_t)(n_chunks - 1)) {
if (!h->is_last) return -1;
if (slice_len == 0 || slice_len > SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_SLICE) return -1;
last_slice_len = slice_len;
} else {
if (h->is_last) return -1;
if (slice_len != SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_SLICE) return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < n_chunks; i++) if (!present[i]) return -1; /* gap */
/* Total computed once from validated seq completeness, checked once
* against out_buf_cap, before any memcpy -- never order-dependent on
* which chunk happens to overflow first. */
total = (uint32_t)(n_chunks - 1) * SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_SLICE + last_slice_len;
if (total > out_buf_cap) return -1;
for (i = 0; i < n_chunks; i++) {
SkHermesMessage *m = chunks[i];
SkHermesChunkHeader *h = (SkHermesChunkHeader *)m->payload_addr;
uint32_t slice_len = m->payload_len - (uint32_t)sizeof(SkHermesChunkHeader);
uint32_t offset = h->seq * SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_SLICE;
memcpy(out_buf + offset, (uint8_t *)m->payload_addr + sizeof(SkHermesChunkHeader), slice_len);
}
*out_len = total;
return 0;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_request(VMUuid requester, VMUuid target) {
return sk_hermes_send_one(requester, target, SK_HERMES_MSG_TYPE_CH_REQUEST,
SK_HERMES_CHANNEL_COMMON, (void *)0, 0);
}
int sk_hermes_channel_respond(VMUuid target, VMUuid requester, int approved) {
int ch = -1;
if (approved) {
ch = sk_hermes_channel_create();
if (ch >= 0) {
if (sk_hermes_channel_subscribe(ch, requester) != 0 ||
sk_hermes_channel_subscribe(ch, target) != 0) {
sk_hermes_channel_destroy(ch); /* leave no half-open channel */
ch = -1;
}
}
}
if (ch >= 0) {
sk_hermes_send_one(target, requester, SK_HERMES_MSG_TYPE_CH_GRANT,
(uint32_t)ch, (void *)0, 0);
/* Ruled ACK cadence (2026-09-21): channel-open + delivery, not
* every message -- this IS that moment. */
sk_hermes_send_one(target, requester, SK_HERMES_MSG_TYPE_ACK,
(uint32_t)ch, (void *)0, 0);
} else {
/* SXLV.1: "a deny is a NACK" -- no separate CH_DENY type. */
sk_hermes_send_one(target, requester, SK_HERMES_MSG_TYPE_NACK,
SK_HERMES_CHANNEL_COMMON, (void *)0, 0);
}
return ch;
}
int sk_hermes_channel_close(VMUuid closer, int channel_id) {
if (channel_id == SK_HERMES_CHANNEL_COMMON) return -1;
if (!sk_hermes_channel_is_member(channel_id, closer)) return -1;
return sk_hermes_channel_destroy(channel_id);
}
int sk_hermes_channel_open_policy(VM *target_vm, VMUuid requester) {
static const char word_name[] = "HERMES-CHANNEL-OPEN?";
DictEntry *entry;
DictEntry *saved_entry;
cell_t result;
if (!target_vm) return 0;
entry = vm_find_word(target_vm, word_name, sizeof(word_name) - 1);
if (!entry || !entry->func) return 0; /* fail closed: no policy, no open */
/* Colon words dispatch through execute_colon_word(), which reads its
* own body address from vm->current_executing_entry and no-ops
* silently if it is NULL (vm_core.c:730) -- vm_interpret_word() always
* sets this immediately before calling entry->func(); matched here
* for the same reason (found live: without it, every call silently
* did nothing, leaving the pushed requester untouched on the stack
* rather than erroring, which is why this needed a debug session to
* catch rather than showing up as an obvious crash). Saved and
* restored, not just set, in case target_vm is ever called into
* mid-dispatch (not exercised by this task's own self-test, but no
* reason to assume it away). */
saved_entry = target_vm->current_executing_entry;
target_vm->current_executing_entry = entry;
vm_push(target_vm, (cell_t)requester.hi);
vm_push(target_vm, (cell_t)requester.lo);
entry->func(target_vm);
target_vm->current_executing_entry = saved_entry;
if (target_vm->error || target_vm->dsp < 0) {
target_vm->error = 0; /* a broken policy word must not leak into
* whatever else target_vm is doing */
return 0;
}
result = vm_pop(target_vm);
return result != 0;
}
#endif /* __STARKERNEL__ */