Commit Graph
15 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 bbfd9103f4 Stage C: cut over BLK-ATTACH-EVENT alone -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.8
The reply leg (Artemis -> Hera ack) that used to flow through
common:messaging.4th's MSG-SEND/MSG-TICK now goes through
kernel-Hermes's sk_hermes_send_one()/sk_hermes_drain_checkpoint()
instead -- FORTH Hermes never sees a BLK-ATTACH-EVENT message again
(SXXXIV.2's partition rule). The request leg was never real FORTH
messaging traffic to begin with (a direct VM-EXEC, no type tag,
forced by Hera's own inability to load common:messaging.4th), so it
is untouched.

New KH-BLK-ATTACH-SEND (repl.c) wraps sk_hermes_send_one(), reached
from capsules/artemis/init.4th's HERA-BLK-ATTACH-REQ. Delivery reuses
task 3.4's already-wired sk_hermes_drain_checkpoint(); BLK-ATTACH-ACK
itself is unchanged, just reached by a different layer.
SK_HERMES_MSG_TYPE_BLK_ATTACH deliberately reuses BLK-ATTACH-EVENT's
own value (9) to document this as a cutover of the same message, not
a new one.

Two real bugs found on the way, both recorded in FABRIC-3.6.md's
findings log:
- A popped FORTH CREATE-buffer address was raw-cast to a host pointer
  instead of going through vm_ptr() -- silently read all-zero memory,
  no crash, no error, just a message that arrived and did nothing.
  Fixed; the rule and its exception (repl.c's own dev-addr is
  legitimately a raw pointer, formatted that way by its own pushing
  code) are written up for the next FORTH-facing C word.
- A separate, genuine hang on the very first live exercise of this
  path, never reproduced across ten subsequent boots. Reported, not
  chased -- not blocking, per the task's own check being otherwise
  fully satisfied.

Also found live: log_message() is invisible in this build's actual
serial-log capture at every level -- settled on a single
console_println in the real drain target instead, one line per real
USB attach, not a hot-path.

Final acceptance (logs/20260922-105501, -105758, -110304, disk images
reset before each): dict_hash identical across all three
architectures for every VM, zero UNKNOWN WORD, mkcapsule --lint
clean, real ledger+stadium_conserved(Artemis)=true evidence on every
boot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 11:08:26 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 f37aa0fb17 Channel-open policy hook -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.7
Added HERMES-CHANNEL-OPEN? ( req-hi req-lo -- allow? ) at
capsules/ACL.4th block 4008 (default: approve everything) -- the one
word policy authors edit. sk_hermes_channel_open_policy(VM*, VMUuid)
(kernel_hermes.h/.c) is the C-side query that calls it via plain
word-dispatch against the target VM's own dictionary/stack, never
vm_interpret() (avoids task 3.4's input-buffer cursor hazard entirely)
and never decides the answer itself. Fails closed: no policy word,
a policy error, or stack underflow all deny, matching CLAUDE.md's
posture that absence of policy must never mean "always allow."

Two real bugs found and fixed before this was called done:
missing current_executing_entry assignment before calling the word's
func pointer (colon words silently no-op without it, vm_core.c:730 --
no crash, just a wrong answer); and a second FAIL with debug
instrumentation still in place whose precise cause isn't
reconstructable, since no intermediate commit exists for that attempt.

Self-test proves the task's check four ways against the same
unchanged C function: default approve, live redefinition to deny
(zero C change), restore, and a VM with no ACL.4th loaded at all
(fail closed). A fifth check wires the result into task 3.6's
sk_hermes_channel_respond() end to end: a denied policy produces a
NACK and no channel, ledger/stadium_conserved() holding throughout.

Scope, per Captain Bob's ruling: closes with the query built and
proven; sk_hermes_channel_respond() still takes a caller-supplied
approved bool rather than calling the policy internally. Wiring a
real channel-open call site to only this query is deferred to
whichever later task first needs a live decision.

dict_hash identical across amd64/aarch64/riscv64 for every VM, zero
UNKNOWN WORD, mkcapsule --lint clean (38 files, 0 violations).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 09:08:48 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 205a49ecd0 ACK/NACK and private-channel negotiation -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.6
Extracted sk_hermes_send_one() from sk_hermes_publish()'s own
per-subscriber body -- one code path for both point-to-point and
fan-out delivery, so the ledger can never diverge between them.
Point-to-point addressing turned out to be load-bearing, not
incidental: sk_hermes_publish()'s fan-out sets msg->to to whichever
member it is iterating, so a negotiation message "published" to the
common channel would spuriously reach every member, not just the real
target (checked with advisor() before building the naive version).
"Over the common channel" means every VM is reachable from birth (task
3.2), not that the exchange itself fans out -- messaging.4th's own
CH-REQUEST carried an explicit `to` for the same reason.

sk_hermes_channel_request/respond/close build the mechanics: request ->
grant (creates a private channel, subscribes both parties, sends
CH_GRANT + one ACK) or NACK ("a deny is a NACK", SXLV.1 -- no separate
type); close authorized by membership alone. The grant/deny decision is
a plain caller-supplied `approved` bool -- task 3.7 replaces the call
site that produces it with a real ACL.4th query, not this signature.

Self-test covers the task's own three checks plus a sibling advisor()
flagged: an approved respond() whose channel creation itself fails
(table exhausted) must still fall through to NACK, not a silent false
grant or half-open channel -- verified by exhausting the whole channel
table and confirming the fallback.

Bug found and fixed before this was called done: the first draft
dropped a message via pending_pop() alone, without releasing it first,
leaking its Stadium heat and failing the self-test's own ledger
baseline check (logs/20260922-065946/amd64/, kept as audit trail).
Fixed and re-verified PASS on all three architectures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 07:25:51 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 8a2ee0fdad Payload bound and chunking -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.5
sk_hermes_publish() now enforces SK_HERMES_CHUNK_MAX_PAYLOAD (1024) on
every message's payload_len uniformly, chunked or not -- closing the
gap task 3.3 explicitly parked. A chunk carrier is
[SkHermesChunkHeader][content slice], slice capped at
1024 - sizeof(header) rather than 1024 itself, so every message on the
wire satisfies the same one-block bound vm_interpret()'s own drain
limit already requires -- a future chunk-aware drain never has to
special-case a carrier that can't be handed to vm_interpret() as-is.

Deliberately no chunking-sender API: building one would need
kernel-Hermes to own chunk-buffer memory with a real lifetime it has no
way to track (kept alive until every subscriber drains it). Sending is
a loop pattern a caller writes with sk_hermes_chunk_count() +
sk_hermes_publish(), demonstrated by this task's own self-test.
sk_hermes_reassemble() is pure and memory-agnostic: validates msg_id
agreement, exact seq coverage, and per-chunk slice sizes before a
single memcpy, with the total length computed once and checked against
the caller's buffer once -- never order-dependent on which chunk
happens to overflow.

Verified live on all three architectures: a 1024-byte payload as one
message, a 1025-byte send refused outright with the ledger untouched,
and a 3000-byte payload split into 3 chunks, drained, and reassembled
byte-exact against the original. dict_hash unmoved and identical
across architectures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 06:51:48 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 2b1ba031a5 Drain at the outermost checkpoint -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.4
sk_hermes_drain_checkpoint() interprets one queued payload per checkpoint
(ruled: one message per checkpoint), reusing sk_vm_at_outermost_interpret()
and placed before the switch-signal block in vm_core.c's existing
cooperative checkpoint (sk_vm_context_switch() doesn't return until
switched back to, so drain must come first or it silently never runs on
a switching checkpoint).

Amends FABRIC-3.5.md SXLIII.5, caught by advisor() before writing the
naive version: "recursive drain is prevented for free" via
g_vm_interpret_depth is true but only for same-message re-drain -- it
doesn't cover the separate same-VM reentrancy hazard FABRIC-3.md SXX
already named for Hera specifically (VMCallState saves rsp/exit_colon/
ecw_nesting only, never input_buffer/input_length/input_pos). Draining
calls vm_interpret() on the same vm whose own vm_interpret() call is
still paused mid-word at the checkpoint; without saving and restoring
the cursor by hand, the enclosing REPL line or LOAD block would be
silently truncated. sk_hermes_drain_checkpoint() snapshots and restores
input_buffer/input_length/input_pos/mode/error/abort_requested around
the call. Not a divergence from the ruling -- cursor preservation is the
implementer's own obligation inside the ruled mechanism.

Gated behind a system-wide pending-total counter so the common
no-message-in-flight case costs one integer read per word dispatch, not
a stadium_max_vm_count()-sized queue scan (also flagged by advisor() as
a real hot-path cost, not deferred).

Verified live on all three architectures: a self-test publishes a real
payload to Hermes, proves the depth gate via VM-EXEC-ing an existing
harmless colon word into Hermes (genuine nested vm_interpret(), depth 2,
must not drain), then drains directly from genuinely-outermost context
and confirms exactly one clean drain. dict_hash unmoved and identical
across architectures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 01:27:11 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 1f6343bc03 Publish path, no dispatch -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.3
sk_hermes_publish() allocates one SkHermesMessage per channel member
(heat-cost ruling 2026-09-21: one message per subscriber, funded by
the publisher's own reservoir) and enqueues each onto a new
per-subscriber SkHermesPendingQueue -- found-or-created lazily by
vm_id, sized from stadium_max_vm_count() like the channel/switch
tables. Best-effort across subscribers: a failed allocation or full
queue skips and rolls back just that one subscriber, not the whole
publish -- the natural reading of "ledger and stadium_conserved() hold
across N publishes to M subscribers" (the task's own check), not a
separate ruling.

Dispatches nothing -- sk_hermes_pending_count()/peek()/pop() are the
read/drain primitives task 3.4's real checkpoint-driven drain will
build on; this task's own self-test uses them directly since no
checkpoint hook exists yet.

Verified live on all three architectures: pending-queue table sized
50/202/50 slots (tracking the channel table's own per-arch sizing), a
synthetic publish self-test (2 publishes to 3 subscribers) confirms
exact per-subscriber delivery counts, and ledger/stadium_conserved()
invariants hold both mid-publish and after manually draining every
queue back to baseline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:49:22 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 a4afdfa591 Channel table + common channel, inert (B1) -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 3.2
Adds SkHermesChannel: a channel is an index into a boot-time,
stadium_max_vm_count()-sized table (same sizing pattern task 3.1
established for the switch table -- no separate numeric rule was ruled
for this table, so task 3.1's bound is extended directly, flagged as
such rather than restated as a new ruling). No name field, mirroring
messaging.4th's own nameless CH-ARENA.

The common channel (index 0) is created at boot and permanent. Hera
subscribes explicitly in kernel_main.c (she is the one VM never born
through capsule_birth_baby()); every other VM -- Tripod fleet and
future WIREBIND identities alike -- subscribes inside
capsule_birth_baby() itself, the single choke point every other birth
already passes through.

Inert: no publish, no dispatch, no ACK/NACK, no ACL hook (tasks 3.3,
3.6, 3.7). Verified live on all three architectures: channel table
sized to 50/202/50 slots (matching switch-signal's own per-arch
sizing), common-channel fleet self-test confirms all four Tripod
members are members, and a synthetic create/subscribe/unsubscribe/
destroy round-trip against a private topic passes, including refusing
to destroy the common channel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:25:13 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 feace42397 Add diagnostic scan cross-check of the Hermes counters -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 2.8
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 08:46:07 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 2a2bf6eb35 Stage B proof: add per-VM consumed term to stadium_conserved -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 2.7
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-20 21:31:45 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 313ffc89e6 Add exact-equality Hermes ledger self-audit -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 2.6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-20 21:02:27 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 d11eb2e5db Add sk_hermes_decay(), ledgering decay into consumed -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 2.5
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-20 18:48:46 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 493d410028 Add the four ledger counters (held/pulled/returned/consumed) -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 2.4
FABRIC-3.5.md SXL.4's ledger: held == pulled - returned - consumed,
epsilon zero. Added sk_hermes_ledger() (an accessor, not a mutator)
plus four static counters in kernel_hermes.c.

Each counter has exactly one increment/decrement site: held/pulled
both move at sk_hermes_alloc()'s single success path, after every
refusal branch has already returned; held/returned both move at
sk_hermes_release()'s single success path. consumed is declared and
always reads 0 -- its one increment site doesn't exist yet, and won't
until task 2.5 gives decay something to record.

sk_hermes_release() now reads the Stadium cell's live header.heat
immediately before calling stadium_evict(), rather than assuming the
original pulled amount -- stadium_evict() zeroes the header as part of
freeing the cell and its own return value is a success code, not the
credited amount, so this is the only point the true remaining heat is
available. Today this always equals the original Q.SLOT pull; once
task 2.5's decay exists, this is what keeps returned correct without
touching this function again.

Self-test (kernel_main.c) extended: snapshots the ledger before
running so it checks its own deltas, verifies held/pulled grow by
exactly got_n * Q_SLOT on allocation with returned/consumed untouched,
then verifies held returns to its starting value and returned grows by
the same amount on release, and checks the audit invariant itself as a
bonus (task 2.6 formalizes this properly).

Three-arch boot clean: amd64/aarch64/riscv64 all reach [zuse@Hera] ok>,
zero UNKNOWN WORD, dict_hash unmoved. All three print PASS with
identical final ledger: held=0 pulled=65536 returned=65536 consumed=0.
No compiler warnings.

Authorized by Captain Bob ("keep going with rhe 6.5 document").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-20 05:59:09 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 2c1dc1753a Correct sk_hermes_alloc() to admit a real Stadium patron; add sk_hermes_release() -- FABRIC-3.6.md tasks 2.2 (amended) + 2.3
Real finding, caught before building release on a foundation that
couldn't support it: task 2.2's first cut of sk_hermes_alloc() pulled
reservoir heat but never admitted a real Stadium-floor patron -- just a
local in_use flag. FABRIC-3.5.md SXXXIII.4 item 1 says MSG-FREE-NODE
returns heat "via STADIUM-EVICT", which only means something if
allocation admitted something. SXL.4's own invariant, Sigma(resident
patron heat) + reservoir + consumed == Q48_ONE, cannot balance if held
heat is invisible to every term while held. Flagged to Captain Bob
before proceeding; authorized to correct 2.2 in the same pass as
building 2.3 on top of the fix.

sk_hermes_alloc() now calls stadium_admit() with heat = the pulled
amount, behaviour = STADIUM_BEHAVIOUR_DELIVER (matching messaging.4th's
own SB-DELIVER STADIUM-ADMIT exactly), and identity = the message's own
slot index (matching the FORTH precedent -- caught live in the first
boot of this fix that omitting this made stadium_dispatch()'s existing
DELIVER diagnostic print msg_idx=0 for every message instead of a
distinct value). The returned cell index is stored in the message's
own stadium_cell field. Stadium-floor refusal (independent of reservoir
affordability) rolls back the pull the same way the other refusal
paths already do.

sk_hermes_release() -- the function task 2.3 actually asks for -- calls
stadium_evict() on that cell, which itself returns the departing
patron's remaining heat to its owning VM's reservoir, matching
MSG-FREE-NODE's exact shape. Release does not touch the reservoir
directly.

Self-test (kernel_main.c) extended: keeps every allocated message's
pointer, allocates to exhaustion as before, releases all of them, and
checks the reservoir returns to precisely its starting value.
"Undecayed" is true by construction (no decay/TTL logic exists yet,
task 2.5) -- exact restoration, not approximate.

Three-arch boot clean: amd64/aarch64/riscv64 all reach [zuse@Hera] ok>,
zero UNKNOWN WORD, dict_hash unmoved from task 2.2. All three print
identical PASS arithmetic: reservoir0=65536, reservoir_after_alloc=0,
reservoir_final=65536. No compiler warnings.

stadium_dispatch()'s DELIVER-case console output (one line per
eviction) is pre-existing instrumentation, not new -- confirmed real
and load-bearing per stadium.c's own comment, verbose but expected.

Authorized by Captain Bob ("yes").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-20 04:20:14 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 9d129fdb1c Add sk_hermes_alloc(), the heat-coupled allocator -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 2.2, item 28
The piece FABRIC-3.5.md SXXXIII.6 calls "what remains genuinely hard,"
built and proven first per its own recommendation. Added
src/starkernel/vm/kernel_hermes.c (wired into Makefile.starkernel's
LOADER_EXTRA_SRCS -- this repo lists vm/*.c files explicitly, no glob)
and sk_hermes_alloc()'s declaration in kernel_hermes.h.

Checks stadium_reservoir_peek(vm_id) >= SK_HERMES_Q_SLOT before
touching the reservoir at all -- refusal this way needs no rollback,
since nothing was pulled -- with an explicit rollback path
(stadium_reservoir_push) kept defensively for the pull-then-short case,
though nothing in this single-core kernel is expected to reach it.

SK_HERMES_Q_SLOT = Q48_ONE / SK_HERMES_MSG_MAX (2048), deliberately
simpler than messaging.4th's own formula, which reserves a Q.1/3 floor
for COMMON-CH's own Stadium heat -- kernel-Hermes has no such object
(SXXXIII.4/SXXXIII.5's flat membership list carries no heat of its
own), so there is nothing left for that floor to protect.

Self-test in kernel_main.c, same diagnostic-only synthetic-VM pattern
as the existing Stadium quota grant self-test (lo=3, distinct from
that test's lo=1): reads back the actual granted reservoir rather than
assuming a number, derives expected_n from it, allocates to refusal,
and checks the refusal lands at exactly expected_n, the reservoir
doesn't move on the refused attempt (rollback proven, not assumed),
and the final reservoir is exactly reservoir0 minus got_n times
Q_SLOT.

Three-arch boot clean: amd64/aarch64/riscv64 all reach [zuse@Hera] ok>,
zero UNKNOWN WORD, dict_hash unmoved from task 2.1 (pure C, no FORTH
touched). All three print identical self-test arithmetic: reservoir0=
65536 Q_SLOT=2048 expected_n=32 got_n=32 reservoir_after=0. No compiler
warnings.

Noted, not fixed: Q_SLOT's divisor and SK_HERMES_MSG_MAX are the same
32, so reservoir and arena exhaustion land at exactly the same count by
construction -- this test can't distinguish which refusal reason
fired, only that refusal is correct and rolls back correctly.

Deliberately not evidence for stadium_conserved(): allocating alone
(no release yet, task 2.3) leaves pulled heat held off the Stadium
floor, so the two-term check would correctly read false right now if
run mid-hold. That's expected, not a bug -- Stage B (task 2.7) is
defined as "before and after the alloc/free cycle," not "continuously
during." This task's self-test checks reservoir arithmetic directly
instead.

Authorized by Captain Bob ("Yes continue").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-19 21:00:20 -04:00
Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5 f10fa7ae83 Add kernel-Hermes message/membership structures -- FABRIC-3.6.md task 2.1, Phase 2 begins
Phase 2, task 2.1 only: type definitions, wired to nothing, drawing no
heat -- no allocator, no protocol logic, no registration anywhere.
FABRIC-3.5.md SXXII.4: Phase 2 structures come first and prove nothing
until the allocator is built on top (task 2.2 onward, each its own
commit).

Added include/starkernel/vm/kernel_hermes.h:

SkHermesMessage -- field-for-field mirror of messaging.4th's live
9-cell MSG-* layout (type/from/to/payload addr+len/Stadium cell
index/seq/channel/orig-type), per SXXXIII.4 item 1 ("roughly half the
file is accessors that become struct fields"), plus an explicit
in_use flag for task 2.2's allocator. Deliberately no separate heat
field: per SXL.4, a message's heat IS the Stadium cell it occupies,
not a value copied alongside it -- one source of truth for the
conservation invariant stadium_conserved() (task 0.7) checks.

SkHermesMembership -- one flat broadcast membership list, SXXXIII.4/
SXXXIII.5's recommended replacement for messaging.4th's 28-word channel
abstraction (traced to exactly one live caller, CH-ADD-MBR). Item 27
(negotiation vs. broadcast, Phase 3 blocker B1) is not answered by this
structure and isn't meant to be -- a flat list is correct either way.

Genuinely wired to nothing: no .c file, no Makefile change, no include
from any compiled source. Syntax-checked standalone (gcc -std=c99
-Wall -Wextra -Werror -fsyntax-only) before touching the real build.

Boot byte-identical to task 1.9's baseline on amd64 (same dict_hash
triple, zero UNKNOWN WORD). Did not repeat aarch64/riscv64 -- the file
compiles into no object on any architecture, so there is no mechanism
by which it could diverge.

Authorized by Captain Bob ("yes").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-19 20:48:24 -04:00