Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
0ec91b517a
Phase B of the identity pipeline (FABRIC-3.md §F.7/§F.17): - x509_ed25519.c/.h: two new DER walkers alongside the existing pubkey extractor -- x509_verify_signature() (verifies a cert's outer Ed25519 signature over the raw, exactly-as-encoded tbsCertificate bytes, real signature verification against issuer_pubkey, rejects non-Ed25519 signatureAlgorithm) and x509_extract_serial() (extracts the serialNumber INTEGER, stripping a DER padding byte if present, for the drive_uuid binding decided in §F.7). - vm_identity.c: vm_identity_from_cert(), ties the three DER primitives together into the actual CERTVERIFY check -- signature verifies against issuer_pubkey, serialNumber matches this drive's own drive_uuid, subject pubkey extracts cleanly -- and populates a VMIdentity on success. acl_caps is caller-supplied, not read from the cert (nothing in the decided cert fields encodes capabilities); deciding what a verified identity is allowed to do is policy for the caller (WIREBIND, not yet built), not this function's job. Verified two ways: a standalone host-side test harness (not part of the kernel build) links the real source files against a real openssl- generated Ed25519 X.509 cert -- extracted pubkey, extracted serial, and signature verification all match ground truth, plus two negative tests (wrong issuer pubkey, corrupted signature) both correctly rejected. Then the actual kernel build verified live on all three architectures: clean compile, clean boot to ok>, Hermes/Artemis both live with no KILL. Same pre-existing, unrelated Zuse fence-write anomaly observed on all three (not caused by this change, not chased here). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019ZGkimpfyh63EZyRkNbkPD
44 lines
1.3 KiB
C
44 lines
1.3 KiB
C
/*
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StarForth — Steady-State Virtual Machine Runtime
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Copyright (c) 2023–2025 Robert A. James
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All rights reserved.
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Licensed under the StarForth License, Version 1.0
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*/
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#ifndef __STARKERNEL__
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#error "vm_identity.c is kernel-only"
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#endif
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#include "starkernel/vm_identity.h"
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#include "starkernel/x509_ed25519.h"
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#include <string.h>
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int vm_identity_has_cap(const VMIdentity *id, uint32_t cap) {
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if (!id || !id->installed) return 0;
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return (id->acl_caps & cap) == cap;
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}
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int vm_identity_from_cert(VMIdentity *out, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len,
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const uint8_t issuer_pubkey[32],
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const uint8_t drive_uuid[16], uint32_t acl_caps) {
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if (!out || !der || !issuer_pubkey || !drive_uuid) return -1;
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if (x509_verify_signature(der, der_len, issuer_pubkey) != 0) return -1;
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uint8_t serial[32];
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size_t serial_len = 0;
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if (x509_extract_serial(der, der_len, serial, sizeof(serial), &serial_len) != 0)
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return -1;
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if (serial_len != 16 || memcmp(serial, drive_uuid, 16) != 0) return -1;
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uint8_t owner_pubkey[32];
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if (x509_extract_ed25519_pubkey(der, der_len, owner_pubkey) != 0) return -1;
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memcpy(out->owner_pubkey, owner_pubkey, 32);
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out->installed = 1;
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out->acl_caps = acl_caps;
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return 0;
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}
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